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This paper presents a profile of the non-executive directors of Australia’s largest 
public companies.  Using descriptive data, it assesses the extent to which these 
companies adhere to the requirements set down in the Australian Stock 
Exchange’s Principles of Good Corporate Governance.  In particular, board 
structure and composition is evaluated, and levels of remuneration and 
independence among non-executive directors are assessed.  The paper concludes 
with a discussion of the need for independence and questions whether 
competence, among other characteristics, is a more valuable characteristic of a 
non-executive director than independence. 
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1. Introduction 
In the wake of high profile business collapses such as Enron, WorldCom, HIH 
Insurance, and OneTel, and the increase in shareholder activism, public attention has 
become more focussed on corporate governance (Petra, 2005; Peaker, 2003; Roberts 
et al., 2005).  A common feature of these corporate scandals has been an inadequate 
system of corporate governance (O’Regan et al., 2005).  Defined as the “system by 
which companies are directed and controlled” (ASX, 2003, p. 3; Long et al., 2005, p. 
667), corporate governance is concerned with the “duties and responsibilities of a 
company’s board of directors in managing the company” (Pass, 2004, p. 52).   
Conflicts of interest between company directors and executives have prompted 
both legislative and non-legislative reform aimed at safeguarding the interests of 
corporate stakeholders and strengthening the independence of company boards 
through the appointment of non-executive directors.  Described as the “mainstay of 
good governance” (Editorial, 2003, p. 287), non-executive directors are considered to 
be a guarantee of the integrity and accountability of company boards.  Although 
efforts to define the role of a non-executive director are said to have “taxed the 
nation’s finest intellects” (Ham, 2002), non-executive directors typically participate in 
long-term decision making, contribute external business expertise, identify potential 
business opportunities, and monitor the actions of company executives (Pass, 2004; 
Long et al., 2005; Higgs, 2003).   
Much of the academic literature concerning corporate governance and board 
composition in Australia and elsewhere has sought to establish causal relationships 
between board structure and firm performance or sought to apply a theoretical 
explanation for the behaviour of corporate boards.  Kiel and Nicholson (2003), for 
example, examined the top 348 companies in the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), 
describing the board composition, examining the correlates of board composition, and 
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attempting to link board demographics with corporate performance.  Sharma (2004) 
studied the relationship between board independence and fraud across a sample of 62 
Australian listed companies.  He found that the presence of independent directors on 
company boards, and the absence of duality (board of director chairman not also 
being the CEO) significantly reduced the likelihood of fraud (Sharma, 2004).  In the 
Malaysian context, Abdullah (2006) used regression analysis to predict, inter alia, the 
relationship between board independence and financial distress using a sample of 
companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia, finding no statistically significant 
relationships between these variables.   
Long et al. (2005) compared the role of non-executive directors between listed 
and unlisted UK companies.  Based on a series of semi-structured interviews which 
covered issues relating to strategy involvement, financial monitoring, and overall 
board contribution, they found that non-executive directors on listed boards are 
inhibited by high levels of visibility, shareholder perception, information asymmetry, 
and the impact of corporate governance regulation (Long et al., 2005).  Brennan and 
McDermott (2004) assessed the extent of independence of boards of companies listed 
on the Irish stock exchange, profiling 80 company’s boards and their adherence to the 
independence requirements set out in the Higgs Report. 
Interestingly, Hooghiemstra and van Manen (2004) proposed an 
“independence paradox” concerning the role of non-executive directors.  They 
conducted telephone interviews and mail questionnaires to survey the opinions of 
Dutch non-executive directors regarding their roles and limitations.  They found that, 
although non-executive directors are expected to operate independently from 
management, in practice, they are unable to do so because they rely on this same 
 4 
group to provide them with the information necessary for decision making, thus 
leading to an independence paradox (Hooghiemstra & van Manen, 2004, p. 322). 
In an examination of the characteristics of non-executive directors in the UK, 
Pass (2004) conducted an empirical study of 50 listed companies.  Gathering data on 
non-executive directors’ characteristics such as age, gender, length of service, 
remuneration, and other directorships, Pass’s (2004) study presented a comprehensive 
profile of non-executive directors within large UK companies and considered the 
consistency of this profile with the requirements and recommendations contained in 
legislative reforms.  The value of studies such as that conducted by Pass (2004) was 
noted by Pettigrew (1992, p. 178) who argued that: 
…the study of boards and their directors has not been helped by over-
ambitious attempts to link independent variables such as board composition 
to outcome variables such as board and firm performance.  The task perhaps 
is a simpler one, to…provide some basic descriptive findings about boards 
and their directors. 
 
Following the lead of Pass’s (2004) study, and keeping in mind the comments of 
Pettigrew (1992), this research provides a descriptive profile of the non-executive 
directors of Australia’s largest public companies.  In the next section, the Australian 
corporate governance framework is reviewed.  This is followed by details of the 
sample of companies examined and a description of the characteristics of the non-
executive directors of these companies.  Finally conclusions are presented, along with 
research limitations and suggestions for future research. 
2. Background: Corporate governance in Australia 
Corporate governance policy reform in Australia has primarily been a 
response to both local and international corporate collapses, which were largely due to 
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fraudulent behaviour and practices of key executives and inadequate corporate 
governance systems.  Even though the Australian corporate failures “lacked the global 
impact of American failures like Enron and WorldCom” (Robins, 2006, p. 34), 
Australian organisations such as HIH Insurance, and OneTel brought home the reality 
of the larger, and more publicised, collapses of US organisations.  The US response 
was principally legislative, for example the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  In Australia 
the response has been a mix of legislative and non-legislative initiatives which have 
included the development of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit 
Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act, known as “CLERP 9”, the adoption of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards, and the establishment of a Corporate 
Governance Council by the ASX (Robins, 2006).   
Work began on CLERP 9 in September 2002, with one of the key aims being 
to restore public confidence in corporate Australia by strengthening the disclosure, 
financial reporting, and governance framework within which Australian businesses 
operate.  Also at this time, the HIH Royal Commission, led by Justice Neville Owen, 
was underway to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the failure of the HIH 
Insurance Group.  The Royal Commission has had an important influence on 
corporate governance in Australia with many definitions, models, and principles 
considered by Justice Owen during his investigation.  In sections 6.1 and 6.2 of the 
HIH Final Report, Justice Owen noted the importance of corporate governance 
structures that would not prejudice the interests of creditors, employees, and 
shareholders, and that would ensure that these stakeholders have confidence in the 
management of the business (HIH Final Report, 2003).  The background, skills, and 
expertise of board members were considered relevant to the development of good 
corporate governance practices and Justice Owen stressed the importance of the 
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presence of independent non-executive directors on company boards (HIH Final 
Report, 2003).   
Just prior to the handing down of Justice Owen’s HIH Final Report in April 
2003, the ASX’s Corporate Governance Council released its ten Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance in March (see Figure 1).  These ten principles, and associated 
recommendations and guidelines, were intended to optimise “corporate performance 
and accountability in the interests of shareholders and the broader community” (ASX, 
2003, p. 5).1 Recognising that not all companies have the same reporting and 
disclosure requirements, and, consistent with the recommendations of Justice Owen 
(HIH Final Report, 2003), the ASX Principles were not made compulsory, however if 
a listed entity elected not to follow the recommendations, justification must be 
provided.   
Take in Figure 1 
As shown in Figure 1, the second principle refers to the structure of the board 
of directors.  It is recommended that boards of listed organisations have a majority of 
non executive independent directors so that the board is able to appropriately 
discharge its responsibilities and duties.  The purpose of non-executive director 
independence, both actual and perceived, is to provide key stakeholders such as 
shareholders and regulators with confidence that the director is sufficiently removed 
from the management of the organisation and “free of any business or other 
relationship that could materially interfere with the exercise of their unfettered and 
independent judgement” (ASX, 2003, p. 19).  Reiter and Rosenberg (2003, p. 1) 
supported this argument by explaining that the true independent director is one who is 
“unconstrained by potential conflicts of interest will bring the sort of rigour and 
                                                 
1 The ASX Corporate Governance Principles have been updated and were to be effective from 1 July 
2007, however the date for their adoption has been postponed until 1 January 2008 (ASX, 2007). 
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critical analysis required to limit recurrences of the debacles we have seen, and restore 
investor confidence”. 
Leblanc and Gillies (2003) suggested that an effective board is composed of 
directors who are independent and competent and behave in manner that supports 
these characteristics.  Competence has been measured by reference to such factors as 
years of experience, qualifications, and breadth of experience (O’Higgins, 2002; Pass, 
2004).  However ascertaining whether or not a director is truly independent is more 
subjective and it may be difficult to determine the level of independence of particular 
directors (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003).  The ASX recommendations enable a non-
executive director to be classified as independent provided he or she is not a 
substantial shareholder of the company, has not been employed by the company in an 
executive capacity during the last three years, has not been a material professional 
advisor of the company during the last three years, has no material contractual 
relationship with the company (ASX, 2003).2  However, while a director may meet 
the ASX definition of an independent director, social relationships, friendships and 
other forms of conflicts can compromise independence (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003).  
Young (2003, p. 2) defines this ASX-type definition of independence as “resume 
independence”.   
 To examine the profile of non-executive directors serving on the boards of 
Australian listed companies, a sample was selected from the ASX 50 listing.  Details 
of the sample and the data gathered are provided in the following section. 
                                                 
2 The ASX Principles (2003) state that an independent director is a non-executive director if he or she 
is not a member of management.  The data for this research were collected on the basis of this 
definition, hence (if not made explicit in the annual report) where an independent director was not part 
of the management team, they were considered a non-executive director, and where non-executive 
directors were considered to be independent from management. 
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3. Empirical tests 
3.1 Sample selection 
A sample of 42 companies was selected from the ASX 50, which comprises 
the 50 largest stocks by market capitalisation in Australia (ASX, 2006).  A list of the 
companies selected for the analysis is presented in Appendix 1.  Eight companies 
were eliminated from the sample because information concerning the non-executive 
directors was absent or the company structure was not typical of a reporting entity.  
For example, Macquarie Airports which consists of three entities, a company 
incorporated in Bermuda, and two trust vehicles (Macquarie Airports, 2006).   The 42 
companies that comprised the sample group for this study were drawn from 9 industry 
sectors, as summarised in Table 1. 
Take in Table 1 
The 2006 annual report for each company of the sample was obtained and, 
consistent with Pass (2004), the following information gathered: 
• Non-executive directors as a percentage of total board of directors 
• Age of each of the non-executive directors, where available 
• Gender of each of the non-executive directors 
• Average time served by the non-executive directors on the company board 
• Remuneration of each non-executive director 
• Number of other non-executive directorships held 
 
The results from this analysis are presented in the following section. 
 9 
4.  Results 
4.1 Non-executive directors as a percentage of total 
As noted, 42 companies were selected for the analysis.  Across that sample 
there were 288 non-executive directors from a total of 354 board members.  
Therefore, in total, 81 percent of company board members were independent non-
executive directors.  The ASX requirement that the majority of board members be 
independent from management was met by all companies sampled.  The companies 
with the lowest percentage of non-executive directors were Macquarie Bank (64 
percent) and Westfield (62 percent), however these boards still maintained a majority 
of non-executive directors.   
In comparison with the UK, it appears that Australian boards contain 
proportionally more non-executive directors.  The majority of companies studied by 
Pass (2004) had non-executive directors comprising between 50 and 60 percent of the 
total board.  It is also interesting to note the results of Kiel and Nicholson’s (2003) 
examination of Australian corporate boards in 1996.  Although their research involved 
a sample of 348 companies and is therefore not comparable to the current study, Kiel 
and Nicholson (2003) reported that the average proportion of non-executive directors 
on Australian company boards in 1996 was 69 percent.   
4.2 Age and gender of non-executive directors 
The average age of non-executive directors on Australian company boards 
ranged from 32 to 74, with the average age being 60 years.  This result is consistent 
with Pass (2004) who reported the average age of non-executive directors on the 
boards of the 50 largest UK companies to be 59 years.  Interestingly, the average age 
of male non-executive directors (61 years) was significantly higher than that of female 
non-executive directors (53 years).   
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There were significantly fewer female non-executive directors compared to 
males, with just 17 percent of company boards including one or more female non-
executive directors.  This compares to Pass’ (2004) study which showed women 
represented 11 percent of the total number of non-executive directors examined.  Both 
these and Pass’s (2004) results appear to be an improvement on the situation 
described by Li and Wearing (2004), who reported that only 6 percent of non-
executive directors in the top 350 UK listed companies were female and suggested 
that women face a “second glass ceiling” even after reaching board level (Li & 
Wearing, 2004, p. 355).  Indeed, there were only two female Chairmen serving on 
Australian company boards during 2006.   
4.3 Time served by non-executive directors  
According to ASX Principle 2, to be considered independent from 
management, a director must “not have served on the board for a period which could 
or could reasonably be perceived to materially interfere with the director’s ability to 
act in the best interests of the company” (ASX, 2003, p. 20).  Therefore, it was 
important to collect data on the length of time served by non-executive directors on 
company boards.  As shown in Table 2, the length of service ranged from less than 
one year to 23 years, with the average time served by non-executive directors on a 
particular company board being 6 years.   
Take in Table 2 
This result is consistent with Pass (2004) who found that the average length of 
service by non-executive directors was 5.6 years.  However, the substantial length of 
time served by some non-executive directors, particularly those spending 10 or more 
years with the same company, could reasonably be perceived to interfere with the 
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independence of these board members from the company and thus conflict with ASX 
Principle 2.   
4.4 Remuneration of non-executive directors 
The ASX Principles provide that non-executive directors may receive 
remuneration but that it must be disclosed clearly and adequately distinguished from 
the remuneration applied to company executives.  In almost all cases this Principle 
was adhered to by the companies sampled.  However, it was the independence 
principle that became questionable upon reviewing the salary packages of non-
executive directors.  The average remuneration of non-executive director chairman of 
company boards in 2006 was $456,946, while the average salary of all other non-
executive directors in that year was $149,662.  While this remuneration pales in 
comparison to the salaries and share options packages received by executives of these 
major companies, it would be difficult to justify, particularly to a layman, the 
independence of non-executive directors from a company that is paying them salary in 
excess of $149,000.   
4.5 Other non-executive directorships 
 There has been global concern over the incidence of multiple directorships 
(Pass, 2004; Kiel & Nicholson, 2006).  Although there may be some benefits of 
multiple directorships, such as bringing to company boards access to key resources, 
the Australian Shareholders Association has argued that any director who serves of 
more than five boards is not acting in the best interests of company shareholders (Kiel 
& Nicholson, 2006).  The non-executive directors examined in this sample held an 
average of three other directorships, with the largest number of other directorships 
held being nine (see Table 3).   
Take in Table 3 
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Many of these multiple directorships are held with other companies within the 
ASX 50.  For example, Ms Elizabeth Alexander serves on the boards of Boral Ltd and 
CSL Ltd, and Dr Nora Scheinkestel serves on the boards of AMP Ltd, Orica Ltd and 
Newcrest Mining Ltd.  Mr David Gonski, a non-executive director of Westfield 
Holdings Ltd, is also the Chairman of Coca-Cola Amatil and a director of ANZ Ltd, 
while Mr Don Argus serves on the boards of BHP Billiton Ltd and Brambles 
Industries Ltd.  These overlapping relationships of directors across companies, 
referred to as interlocking directorships in the literature, enable board’s to remain 
strategically aware of other company’s actions and may facilitate the development of 
strong lobbying positions among major corporations (Murray, 2001).   
5.  Summary and conclusion 
This study has indicated that Australia’s largest companies are adopting ASX 
Principles of Good Corporate Governance.  One of the key issues in Australian 
corporate governance reform has been the appointment of non-executive directors to 
company boards (ASX, 2003; Robins, 2006).  In this analysis of 42 companies, of the 
354 board members reviewed, 81 percent were non-executive directors.  However, 
despite the appointment of non-executive directors to corporate boards, concerns as to 
the actual and perceived independence of these directors persist.  While actual 
independence may be difficult to ascertain without being privy to the nuances of 
boardroom friendships, social relationships, and other forms of potential conflict, the 
perception of independence may be significantly compromised by the levels of 
remuneration received by non-executive directors.  In the companies’ sampled, the 
average level of remuneration of non-executive chairmen was $456,946 and, for non-
executive directors, average remuneration was in excess of $149,000.  It would be 
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difficult to explain to key stakeholders at an annual general meeting that a non-
executive director of a company can act independently while at the same time 
receiving such substantial compensation.  The ASX Principles address this issue by 
simply stating that the level of remuneration must be “sufficient and reasonable” 
(ASX, 2003, p. 51).  The subjectivity of these terms inhibits their usefulness as a 
source of valuable guidance.  A related issue was identified by Hooghiemstra and van 
Manen (2004) as the independence paradox which arises due to non-executive 
directors, in the course of fulfilling their responsibilities, relying heavily on the 
information provided by the same executives from whom they are to said to be 
independent. 
The primary limitation of this study is the size bias resulting from the review 
of Australia’s largest companies.  The research could be extended to include a random 
sample of companies outside the top 50 and the examination could be conducted over 
a period of time to obtain a broader perspective of corporate governance practices in 
Australia.  Future research could also incorporate theoretical perspectives such as 
network theory used by Murray (2001) to explain interlocking directorships across 
company boards. 
It is argued that the presence of competent non-executive directors on the 
boards of companies is a significant benefit to the majority of stakeholders of 
organisations, particularly shareholders and regulators (Pass, 2004; Kiel & Nicholson, 
2003).  Non-executive directors can contribute significantly to organisations through 
setting organisational strategy, monitoring the performance of and reporting from 
executive management, and contributing to the development or removal of executive 
management.  However, is the benefit to key stakeholders the result of directors’ 
independence, their competence or a mixture of both?  The lack of prescriptive 
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legislation in Australia, the fact that the current ASX guidelines are based on a 
“comply or explain” philosophy (Higgs, 2003), and the absence of specific guidance 
on the role of non-executive directors in the ASX guidelines means that concern over 
the independence of non-executive directors is likely to continue.   
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Appendix 1: Companies selected for analysis from the ASX 50 
 
Symbol Company Sector
AWC            Alumina Limited Materials
AMC            Amcor Limited Materials
AMP            AMP Limited Financials
ALL            Aristocrat Leisure Limited Consumer Discretionary
ANZ            Australia And New Zealand Banking Group Limited Financials
AGL            Australian Gas Light Company (The) Utilities
BHP            BHP Billiton Limited Materials
BSL            Bluescope Steel Limited Materials
BLD            Boral Limited Materials
BIL            Brambles Industries Limited Industrials
CCL            Coca-Cola Amatil Limited Consumer Staples
CML            Coles Myer Limited Consumer Staples
CBA            Commonwealth Bank Of Australia Financials
CSL            CSL Limited Health Care
FXJ            Fairfax (John) Holdings Limited Consumer Discretionary
FGL            Foster's Group Limited Consumer Staples
IAG            Insurance Australia Group Limited Financials
JHX            James Hardie Industries N.V. Materials
LLC            Lend Lease Corporation Limited Financials
MBL            Macquarie Bank Limited Financials
NAB            National Australia Bank Limited Financials
NCM            Newcrest Mining Limited Materials
ORI            Orica Limited Materials
ORG            Origin Energy Limited Energy
PMN            Promina Group Limited Financials
QAN            Qantas Airways Limited Industrials
QBE            Qbe Insurance Group Limited Financials
RIN            Rinker Group Limited Materials
RIO            Rio Tinto Limited Materials
STO            Santos Limited Energy
SGB            St George Bank Limited Financials
SGP            Stockland Financials
SUN            Suncorp-Metway Limited. Financials
TAH            Tabcorp Holdings Limited Consumer Discretionary
TLS            Telstra Corporation Limited. Telecommunications Services
TCL            Transurban Group Industrials
WES            Wesfarmers Limited Industrials
WDC            Westfield Group Financials
WBC            Westpac Banking Corporation Financials
WPL            Woodside Petroleum Limited Energy
WOW            Woolworths Limited Consumer Staples
Source: Standard & Poor's - Indicies S&P/ASX 50 (available at: 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/au/page.topic/indices_asx50/)  
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Figures and tables 
 
Figure 1: ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance
Recognise and publish the respective roles and responsibilities of board and management.
Promote timely and balanced disclosure of all material matters concerning the company.
Respect the rights of shareholders and facilitate the effective exercise of those rights.
Establish a sound system of risk oversight and management and internal control.
Fairly review and actively encourage enhanced board and management effectiveness.
Recognise legal and other obligations to all legitimate stakeholders.
Source: ASX, 2006
10. Recognise the legitimate interests of stakeholders 
Actively promote ethical and responsible decision-making.
5. Make timely and balanced disclosure 
6. Respect the rights of shareholders 
8. Encourage enhanced performance 
9. Remunerate fairly and responsibly  
Ensure that the level and composition of remuneration is sufficient and reasonable and that its 
relationship to corporate and individual performance is defined.
7. Recognise and manage risk 
Have a structure to independently verify and safeguard the integrity of the company’s financial 
reporting.
A company should: 
1. Lay solid foundations for management and oversight 
2. Structure the board to add value 
4. Safeguard integrity in financial reporting 
3. Promote ethical and responsible decision-making 
Have a board of an effective composition, size and commitment to adequately discharge its 
responsibilities and duties.
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Table 2: Time served by non-executive directors
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Table 3: Number of other directorships held
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